investment management and fiduciary services insight

- Spring 2003 -


 

What’s New? An Overview on the Latest Privacy Issues

 

By William Campbell Ries, Esq.

 

Recent developments in technology have increased the ability of financial institutions to gather and retain data.  These developments have enabled banks to take advantage of large reservoirs of customer information.  As a result, financial institutions are better able to serve their customers and profit from sharing the information.  On the other hand, the proliferation of information has led to privacy concerns among customers and consumers.

 

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act prohibits financial institutions from disclosing non-public personal information to unaffiliated third parties without first providing the customer with the opportunity to decline to have such information disclosed.  Banks are required to develop policies and procedures to ensure that confidential customer information is protected.  One important requirement is that financial institutions must disclose, when a customer relationship is established and annually thereafter, its privacy policies including its policies concerning sharing information with affiliates and non-affiliated third parties.  States are permitted to enact their own privacy statutes so long as they provide greater protections than the Act.

 

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (Act) requires consumer reporting agencies to adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for customer credit, personnel, insurance and other

information which is fair and equitable to consumers with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of information.  The Act as amended permits companies to share with their affiliates information respecting their transactions and experience with a customer without providing notification to the customers.  Other information such as credit reports and application information may not be shared with affiliates unless customers are given “clear and conspicuous” notice and an opportunity to opt out.

 

The Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts state law until January 1, 2004.  Then states may override the Fair Credit Reporting Act authorization for inter-affiliate sharing of consumer information by enacting a state law or provision in the state constitution that explicitly states that it supplements the Fair Credit Reporting Act and provides greater protection than the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Until January 1, 2004, the Act preempts state law and allows for a national and uniform standard for sharing consumer credit information by providing notice and an opportunity to opt out.  This preemption expires on January 1, 2004, unless Congress acts to reauthorize the Act.

 

The United States Senate and House of Representatives have scheduled hearings on the reauthorization of the Fair Credit Reporting Act which is considered one of the major issues before Congress this year.  Questions for consideration are:

  • Should Gramm-Leach-Bliley require “Opt Out” for information shared by affiliates as in the Fair Credit Reporting Act?

  • What are the costs of compliance?

  • Should Gramm-Leach-Bliley require “Opt In” for sharing with non-affiliated third parties?

  • Should Gramm-Leach-Bliley require “Opt In” for sharing  “sensitive information?”

  • If so, how do you define “sensitive information?”

  • Should the same standards apply to sharing information among affiliates as to joint ventures and marketing agreements?

  • Should Gramm-Leach-Bliley establish a national standard for privacy?

It is important to ensure that your internal policies and procedures comply with applicable law. We would be pleased to assist you in reviewing your privacy policies and procedures.

 

William Campbell Ries is a shareholder in the firm’s Investment Management & Fiduciary Services Group. For more information on privacy issues, please contact Bill at 412.594.5646 or via e-mail at wries@tuckerlaw.com.

 

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Trustees May Now Be Required to Collect Contributions As Well As Invest Plan Assets

 

By William Campbell Ries, Esq.

 

In recent years many courts have sought to expand the duties of ERISA fiduciaries to protect the interests of participants and their beneficiaries.  A recent case, Best v. Cyrus, 6th Cir., Common Number 01-5799, 11/19/02, decided by the Sixth Circuit, is an example of this trend.  The court held that the trustee of a retirement plan has a duty to secure contributions owed to the plan irrespective of language in the governing instrument to the contrary.  The court also held that language in the pension plan that limited a plan trustee’s duties did not absolve the trustee from its duties under ERISA. 

 

The Court’s decision was based upon the following facts:  Ronald R. Cyrus served as trustee of the Kentucky State AFL/CIO Money Purchase Pension Plan.  He was responsible under the trust agreement for administering investments, receiving contributions, making distributions and keeping accurate records.  He also served as Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the plan sponsor.  Cyrus was removed as plan trustee when it was discovered that he failed to make the required salary-based contributions to the plan and failed to credit repayments of participants’ loans. 

 

The successor trustees, and the plan participants, brought an action against Cyrus alleging breach of his fiduciary responsibilities for failing to ensure that required contributions were made to the plan and by not securing loan repayments which were owed to the plan.  Cyrus argued that the plan document specifically set forth the trustee’s duties.  Under the plan, the plan administrator, not the trustee, was responsible for securing  contributions and repayments.  Therefore, Cyrus argued, he was protected by the language in the trust.

 

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed the suit, finding as a matter of law that Cyrus had no duty to act regarding the contributions, repayments or filing of the annual report forms because the language in the governing instrument said that he had no duty to collect contributions.  The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

 

The parties agreed that Cyrus was a fiduciary with respect to the plan.  The Court of Appeals held that the plan document must be construed to require the trustee to act in the best interests of the plan’s beneficiaries.  As such, Cyrus could not be excused from his fiduciary duties under ERISA.  The language of the plan document could not absolve him of a duty to secure the contributions and repayments.  He had a specific duty to secure contributions and repayments because “ERISA clearly assumes that trustees will act to ensure that a plan receives all funds to which it is entitled. . .” 

 

Therefore, the court found that the duty to act regarding contributions and repayment arises from the duty to administer and manage the plan’s assets and is rooted in ERISA.  As such, the duty cannot be avoided.  The opinion went on to state “we conclude that a trustee has a duty to act in the interest of the plan’s beneficiaries, even though he is not specifically directed to act under the plan document, because ERISA imposes additional duties on trustees through its incorporation of the common law of trusts.” 

 

Generally, courts hold that a trustee’s duties are limited to those set forth in the governing instrument.  Although only applicable in the Sixth Circuit, the court found that exculpatory language in the governing instrument is insufficient to protect the trustee from liability if the court finds that ERISA imposes a broader range of responsibility. 

 

Trustees should be aware of this trend to broaden the scope of a trustee’s duties and not rely exclusively upon exculpatory provisions in the governing instrument to protect them from liability.  The Court’s holding makes it difficult for a trustee to know the scope of its duties and responsibilities without further guidance.  Perhaps liability could have been avoided had Cyrus brought the failure to make contributions to the attention of the plan administrator or the Department of Labor.    

 

Although not addressed by the court, it might have held differently if Cyrus was not also an officer of the plan sponsor.

 

A trustee should review its duties and responsibilities under the documents under which it operates to determine the scope of its responsibilities.  If there is doubt, you should consult with counsel to determine whether exculpatory language will protect you.  If the duties are required under ERISA, the trustee may be responsible for performing them irrespective of the provisions in the governing instrument.

 

William Campbell Ries is a shareholder in the firm’s Investment Management & Fiduciary Services Group. For more information on privacy, please contact Bill at 412.594.5646 or via e-mail at wries@tuckerlaw.com.

 

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Pennsylvania’s Decoupling of Its Estate Tax From the Federal “State Death Tax Credit” Amount

 

William Campbell Ries, Esq.

 

The federal Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (“EGTRRA”) made significant changes to the federal estate tax.  Most notably, EGTRRA gradually increases the applicable credit amount between 2002 and 2009, first raising it from $675,000 in 2001 to $1,000,000 in 2002 and culminating with a credit amount of $3,500,000 in 2009.  The Act then eliminates the federal estate tax for those dying in 2010.  Finally, the Act expires with the end of 2010, causing the estate tax to reappear and the credit amount to return to $1,000,000.  The applicable credit amount is the amount, after taking into account allowable deductions and credits, that a person may pass to his or her heirs and beneficiaries free from federal estate tax.

 

In addition to increasing the applicable credit amount, EGTRRA also gradually phases out the “state death tax credit” between 2002 and 2005 (by 25% per year), with the complete elimination of the credit for decedents dying in 2005 and thereafter (until 2011 when EGTRRA expires).  Generally speaking, this state death tax credit reduces the federal estate tax by the amount of death taxes paid to any state, up to a maximum rate of 16% based on a graduated scale. 

 

Most states collect death taxes based at least in part on the amount of the state death tax credit.  When the state death tax credit is gradually reduced and finally eliminated, the same will happen to those states’ revenue from death taxes, unless preventative measures are taken.  Many states are taking actions to “decouple” their death taxes from the federal law so that their revenue streams are protected from adverse consequences from changes in the federal law.

 

Pennsylvania has both an inheritance tax and an estate tax.  The inheritance tax is not based on the federal estate tax but instead is a percentage of value of the estate subject to the tax, with the percentage determined by the relationship between the decedent and the person receiving the assets.  Pennsylvania’s estate tax, however, is directly based on the federal estate tax in that the amount of estate tax is equal to the amount by which the state death tax credit exceeds the inheritance tax actually paid by the estate.  Reducing and eliminating the state death tax credit, therefore, would eventually eliminate the estate tax as a source of revenue.  The dichotomy of Pennsylvania’s death tax system places Pennsylvania in a better position than the many states that have their entire systems tied to the federal estate tax system, but the loss of estate tax would be a significant blow to the state’s revenue.

 

On June 28, 2002, Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives and Senate both passed House Bill 1848 and put it into the hands of the Governor, who signed it into law on June 29, 2002 as Act 89 of 2002 (“Act 89”).  It applies to decedents dying after June 30, 2002.  Act 89 specifically provides that 

 

except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning, and, unless specifically provided otherwise, any reference in this article to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Public Law 99-514, 26 U.S.C. §1 et seq.) as amended to June 1, 2001 (Section 28 of Act 89, amending Section 2102 of the Pennsylvania Inheritance and Estate Tax Act (the “Tax Act”).)

 

Sections 29 and 30 of Act 89 amend Section 2117 and 2145 of the Tax Act to clarify that the amount of the Pennsylvania estate tax is the amount that would be owed under the federal estate tax system as it  existed on June 1, 2001 and that the state may require another tax form to be filed reflecting the tax results under that prior system, even if the estate is not required to file an actual federal estate tax return.  Under Act 89, the Pennsylvania estate tax is, therefore, determined based on the amount of state death tax credit that would have been allowed to the estate prior to EGTRRA.  Additionally, the state death tax credit is based on the applicable credit amount indicated by the prior federal estate tax law, which for 2002 was $700,000, not $1,000,000 as provided for by EGTRRA.

 

Some commentators question the constitutionality of the new estate tax scheme.  Pennsylvania’s constitution requires that all taxes be “uniform,” which has been interpreted to prohibit any type of dollar exemption or graduated tax.  Because the state death tax credit incorporates both a dollar exemption and a graduated tax rate, Pennsylvania’s estate tax based on the state death tax credit may not be constitutional.  In the past the estate tax was determined to be constitutional because it did not result in a net increase in death taxes paid by an estate because each dollar of estate tax that was paid equally reduced the federal estate tax to be paid, so only the payee of the tax changed, not the amount of the tax.  Under Act 89 the estate would not receive a corresponding credit against federal estate tax for the amount of Pennsylvania estate tax, so the estate tax would increase the total death taxes paid by an estate subject to the Pennsylvania estate tax.

 

Act 89 is likely to be only a temporary solution because (1) EGTRRA is scheduled to expire at the end of 2010 and (2) its constitutionality is likely to be successfully challenged (at least in the opinions of many commentators).  Because Act 89 only became effective fordecedents dying after June 30, 2002, no challenges have been made so far.  The death tax returns and the corresponding tax payments for decedents dying on or after July 1, 2002 (after the effective date of Act 89) will be due in the next few months, and the legal wrangling is likely to begin soon thereafter.

 

All of these changes to the tax laws can have effects on the living as well as the estates of the dead.  To ensure that your  estate plan is revised to address these changes in the federal and state deathtax schemes and those to come, keep in touch with your estate planning attorney and be certain that you review your estate plan more frequently than was necessary in the past.  We suggest that everyone consult your attorney at least every two years and whenever a significant change occurs in your family or assets until the tax systems are stabilized.

 

William Campbell Ries is an attorney in the firm’s Business and Estates Department. For more information on this topic, please contact Bill at 412.594.5646, wries@tuckerlaw.com.

 

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Compliance Issue: The Uniform Principal & Income Act

 

By William Campbell Ries, Esq.

 

Last year, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Uniform Principal and Income Act (the “Act”) which substantially changes the administration of trusts in Pennsylvania.  Not only does the Act redefine what constitutes principal and income, it also mandates how receipts and disbursements should be allocated.  The Act is a substantial change and improvement over the prior Principal and Income Act because it provides extensive guidance to trustees.

 

The Act introduces two novel concepts:  the power to adjust and the power to convert to a total return trust.  The power to adjust is mandatory and must be reviewed each year in connection with the annual account review of all existing trusts. 

It enables the trustee to move principal to income or income to principal in order to provide fair and equitable treatment to beneficiaries. 

 

The power to switch to a total return trust is optional but should also be considered in situations in which the income beneficiary is seeking consistency of income.  It enables the trustee to invest for total return while meeting the income beneficiaries’ needs.

We understand that bank examiners are now reviewing banks’ compliance with this new Act.  Banks should ensure that new policies and procedures are adopted and effective to ensure compliance with the Act.

 

Banks which do not comply may face potential litigation from account beneficiaries or regulatory sanctions.  We would be pleased to assist you in establishing or reviewing your procedures to ensure compliance with the Act.

 

William Campbell Ries is a shareholder in the firm’s Investment Management & Fiduciary Services Group. Bill served as Chairman of the Joint State Commission Subcommittee which drafted the new Act. For more information on privacy, please contact Bill at 412.594.5646 or via e-mail at wries@tuckerlaw.com.

 

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What's Inside
 

Ø

What’s New? An Overview on the Latest Privacy Issues


  Ø Trustees May Now Be Required to Collect Contributions As Well As Invest Plan Assets
 
 
  Ø Pennsylvania’s Decoupling of Its Estate Tax From the Federal “State Death Tax Credit” Amount
 
 
  Ø Compliance Issue: The Uniform Principal & Income Act
 
 

 



 


 


 

 




 












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