healthlaw reference

- March 2004 -

Medicare Reassignment: Major Change

The Medicare Prescription Drug Act made a small but major change to the reassignment rules. It changed the independent contractor provision by deleting the requirement that the arrangement apply to hospitals and clinics and substituting any “contractual arrangement.” Although this is subject to further clarification by regulation, and it does not address either Stark or Anti-Kickback issues, it could greatly simplify cash flow, and therefore tax issues in joint ventures.

For more information, contact Mike Cassidy at 412-594-5515 or mcassidy@tuckerlaw.com

New Interest in Health Savings Accounts

By Michelle L. Kopnski, Esq.

There is good news for employers who hope to control rising health care expenses by offering high deductible health plans, especially those with relatively few non-principals as employees.  The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 introduced the Health Savings Account (“HSA”).  An HSA is a tax-exempt trust or custodial account (much like an individual retirement account) which is established exclusively to pay qualified medical expenses of the account holder and his or her spouse and dependents.  In general, tax-deductible contributions made to an HSA are accumulated tax-free and distributed tax-free to pay for or to reimburse the account holder for qualified medical expenses incurred until the account holder’s high deductible health plan begins to cover the medical expenses. 

An HSA may be established by any individual who: 

1. Is not eligible for Medicarebenefits (generally, under age 65);

2. Is covered under a high deductible health plan (and not covered under any other health plan that is not a high deductible health plan); and

3. Cannot be claimed as a dependent on another person’s tax return. 

A “high deductible health plan” is one that has an annual deductible of at least $1,000 and an annual out-of-pocket maximum of no more than $5,000 for individual coverage and an annual deductible of at least $2,000 and an annual out-of-pocket maximum of not more than $10,000 for family coverage.

An HSA can be established with a qualified HSA trustee or custodian, in similar fashion to the way that an individual establishes an individual retirement account with a qualified IRA trustee.  In addition to certain persons specifically approved by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), any insurance company or any bank may be an HSA trustee or custodian.  No permission or authorization is required from the IRS to establish an HSA.  Although HSAs may be beneficial to employers by helping to control health care expenses, an HSA can be established by any individual with or without involvement from his or her employer.  

Contributions to an HSA can be made by the individual account holder, by the employer of the account holder, or by family members on behalf of the account holder.  The maximum annual contributions to HSAs cannot exceed the annual deductible under the associated high deductible health plan, or if less, $2,600 for individual coverage (for 2004) or $5,150 for family coverage (for 2004).  The contribution limits will be adjusted for inflation.  For individuals (and their spouses) who are between the ages of 55 and 65, the contribution limit is increased by $500 in 2004.  This “catch-up contribution” amount is increased by $100 per year until it reaches $1,000 in 2009.  No contributions may be made to an HSA after the account holder has reached age 65.

Contributions that are made to an HSA by the account holder, or by a family member on behalf of the account holder, are deductible by the account holder in determining adjusted gross income.  As an “above-the-line” deduction, the contributions are deductible regardless of whether the account holder itemizes deductions and the deduction is not subject to any phase-out.  Additionally, there are no income limits associated with the amount deductible.  Contributions made by an employer to an employee’s HSA are treated as employer-provided coverage  for medical expenses under an accident or health plan.  As such, those contributions are excludable from the employee’s gross income, are not subject to payroll taxes and are deductible by the employer.  Contributions can be made with pre-tax salary reductions through a cafeteria plan.  Contributions made by the account holder, or by a family member, in excess of the limits are not deductible by the account holder.  Contributions made by an employer in excess of the limits are included in the gross income of the account holder and are not deductible by the employer. 

Employer contributions are subject to nondiscrimination rules.  If an employer makes an HSA contribution, the employer must make available comparable contributions on behalf of all eligible employees.  A contribution is considered to be “comparable” if it is the same amount or if it is the same percentage of the deductible under the high deductible health plan.

An HSA generally is tax-exempt.   Amounts held in an HSA can be investedand any earnings on such amounts are not taxed (i.e., inside buildup in an HSA is tax-free.)  Distributions from an HSA are excludible from the gross income of the account holder if the amount distributed is used exclusively to pay for “qualified medical expenses” of the account holder, his or her spouse and dependents.  Any amount of the distribution that is used for any other purpose is includible in the gross income of the account holder and is  subject to a 10 percent excise tax. 

Qualified medical expenses are amounts paid for medical care and include deductibles and co-payments under a health plan and expenses not covered under a health plan such as nonprescription drugs, vision care and dental care.  In general, health insurance premiums are not qualified medical expenses.  However, qualified medical expenses include premiums paid for qualified long-term care insurance, COBRA health care continuation coverage, health care coverage while an individual is receiving unemployment compensation and certain coverage for individuals over age 65. 

In addition to the benefits listed above, an HSA offers two additional advantages which likely will make it a very popular choice for employees and employers.  First, any amounts that are unused may be carried forward to future years.  Second, amounts in an HSA are portable to a new job or into retirement. 

The introduction of the HSA brings new opportunities for employers to examine alternate health care plan designs, reduce health care costs and at the same time provide satisfying consumer-driven health care to their employees.

For more information, please contact Mike Cassidy at 412-594-5515, mcassidy@tuckerlaw.com or Michelle Kopnski at 412-594-5522, mkopnski@tuckerlaw.com.

The Tax Act That Keeps on Giving

By Charles J. Vater, Esq.

We have commented from time to time in these pages about the significance of the passage of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 (EGTRA) as it impacts estate planning and the payment of Federal estate taxes.  Prior to the passage of EGTRA, the Federal estate tax exemption amount was $675,000.  This amount was scheduled to increase to $1 million over several years.  EGTRA, however, immediately increased the Federal estate tax exemption to $1 million, an increase of $325,000 in one year.

Although this $325,000 increase in the Federal estate tax exemption was significant, the increase from 2003 to 2004 is even more dramatic.  Under EGTRA, the Federal estate tax exemption amount in 2004 and 2005 has been increased to $1.5 million, an increase of $500,000.  This now means that with proper planning married spouses may each pass $1.5 million free of the payment of Federal estate tax or a total of $3 million on a combined basis.

Conversely, for those clients whose total estates are less than $1.5 million and whose Wills contain trusts which are designed to reduce or eliminate the payment of Federal estate tax (the so-called marital/family (credit shelter) trusts or “A/B” trusts), the increase in the exemption amount to $1.5 million may give these clients an opportunity to simplify their estate plans.

For those clients whose estates are between $1.5 million and $3 million, and whose Wills have the typical A/B trust arrangement, the increase in the estate tax exemption amount to $1.5 million may have unanticipated consequences affecting the surviving spouse.  Under the typical A/B trust arrangement, when the first spouse dies, the B trust or family trust will be funded with an amount up to the amount of the estate tax exemption ($1.5 million).  Since this trust is often for the benefit of the entire family instead of only the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse may find herself or himself without control over, or direct access to, funds which may be needed by the surviving spouse.  In some circumstances this may be the desired result, but a careful review of whether you should fund the B trust or family trust with the maximum exemption amount should be undertaken so that unanticipated consequences do not occur simply because the Federal estate tax exemption amount has been increased to $1.5 million.

As a reminder, the increase in the Federal estate tax exemption amount to $1.5 million brings with it an increase in the generation skipping transfer tax exemption amount to $1.5 million.  However, it does not bring with it an increase in the lifetime exemption of $1 million for gift tax purposes.  In other words, the maximum lifetime gifts (in excess of a person’s annual exclusion gifts) that can be made without incurring a gift tax remains $1 million notwithstanding the fact that the Federal estate tax exemption amount has increased to $1.5 million.

The increase in the Federal estate tax exemption to $1.5 million brings with it tremendous planning opportunities either to simplify an estate plan or to assure that the maximum amount is passed from generation to generation with as little or no Federal estate tax paid as possible.  Given the high tax rates which are involved with the Federal estate taxes (45 percent to 48 percent), a well planned estate can save hundreds of thousands of dollars.

If you would like to discuss your estate plan with us, please contact Chuck Vater, Chair of the firm’s Estate and Trust Practice Group.  Chuck can be reached at 412-594-5556 or via e-mail at cvater@tuckerlaw.com.

Confidentiality of Peer Review Records:  Fact or Fiction?

By Michael A. Cassidy, Esq.

Many of us have heard or made the argument that physicians and other individual providers should be denied access to their peer review file on the grounds of state or federal peer review confidentiality laws.  We have heard the anguished arguments that access will destroy peer review, chill the  willingness of the peer reviewers to participate and be candid, and expose all who participate to unnecessary liability just for attempting to improve the quality of healthcare.  This is all misguided; immunity is provided to protect the peer review process.  Confidentiality does not apply to the peer review process; it applies to third parties who attempt to use peer review records for other matters.    

“The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), provides qualified immunity for persons providing information to a professional review body regarding the competence or professional conduct of a physician.  It also established confidentiality for information reported under the act, but did not establish confidentiality for peer review records or protect peer review records and materials from discovery and court subpoena.  The absence of such privilege in this statute is evident that Congress did not intend these records to have the level of confidentiality and protection advanced by the hospitals and provided in the state statute.”  Robertson v. The Neuromedical Center.

The purpose of this article is to dispel the myth that HCQIA has established any privilege other than maintaining the confidentiality of the information reported to the National Practitioners Data Bank, analyze recent cases that discuss the federal common law privilege, and compare how some states have addressed this issue.

HCQIA Does Not Create Privilege

In their misguided zeal to protect peer review following the enactment of HCQIA, some courts have confused the principles of immunity and privilege.  For example, in Cohn v. Wilkes General Hospital,  the District Court denied a motion to compel discovery. 

“Section 11111(a)(1)(A) limits the liability of the ‘professional review body’ from all ‘damages under any law of the United States or of any state (or political subdivision thereof) with respect to the action.’  By definition, the term ‘professional review body’ includes the hospital, its governing body, or any committee of a health care entity which conducts professional review activity, including any committee of the medical staff of such entity when assisting the governing body in a professional review activity.  The term ‘professional review action’ includes the granting or denial of privileges at the hospital.  Although this law did not become effective until after many of the events changed in this case, the very existence of the Act and the Congressional findings incorporated into the body of the law itself, support the public policy which protects as privileged the medical review process…Thus, there is both a state privilege, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.11(a)(17) (1988) and a federal immunity principle which are applicable to this case.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery is denied.”  Cohn v. Wilkes General Hospital, Supra, 121. 

The language of the analysis inherently discloses the confusion; it talks about being both a “state privilege” and “a federal immunity principle” and uses that as justification for denying plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery.  However, if there truly is immunity, confidentiality is irrelevant.  Whether confidentiality must in fact be waived in order to actually qualify for federal immunity under HCQIA will be addressed later herein when we discuss due process requirements. 

HCQIA does not establish any rule or principle that peer review information in general is either confidential or privileged.  Section 11137 merely states that:  “Information reported under this subchapter is considered confidential and shall not be disclosed (other than to the physician or practitioner involved)…”  This states only that the Data Bank will not disclose the information reported to it pursuant to HCQIA, and explicitly excludes the affected physician or practitioner from that provision.  Of course, this concept of disclosure is really a moot point.  By the time the adverse peer review action has actually been reported to the Data Bank, the physician is presumably well aware of the action itself, although the physician may not have the underlying information.  

Subsequent decisions have recognized this distinction.

In Rdzanek v. Hospital Service District #3, the hospital’s motion to quash one cardiologist’s subpoena for the peer review records for all cardiologists on staff, to prove denial of due process, was denied, with the court stating: 

 “The defendants and non-parties contend in their memoranda that the Health Care Quality Immunity Act (“HCQIA”) supports the argument that the peer review documents at issue are privileged.  The HCQIA provides qualified immunity for persons providing information to a professional review body regarding the competence or professional conduct of a physician.  The majority of courts addressing the issue, however, have concluded that HCQIA does not establish a federal peer review privilege.  Clearly, the HCQIA nowhere provides for evidentiary exclusion of peer review materials.  The Court concludes that the HCQIA does not establish a federal statutory medical peer review privilege.”  Rdzanek, supra at 10.

In Teasdale v. Marin General Hospital, Dr. Teasdale’s surgical privileges were rescinded and Dr. Teasdale ultimately sued the hospital and several other defendants, alleging antitrust violations inter alia, and subpoenaed peer review records, including minutes from various meetings.  The magistrate denied plaintiff’s motion to compel production, but the District Court reserved and compelled production, stating: 

“First, the passage of a statute specifically addressing peer review issues and, indeed, the giving of qualified immunity to peer reviewers, is strong evidence that Congress not only considered the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the peer review process, but took the action it believed would best balance protecting such confidentiality with other important federal interests.  Congress spoke loudly with its silence in not including a privilege against discovery of peer review materials in the HCQIA.” Teasdale, supra at 694. 

In Mattice v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Dr. Mattice filed an action alleging employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act  and sought production of peer review documents.  The court granted the motion to compel production subject to a protective order protecting the hospital’s privacy concerns, stating:

“All of the cases cited above that have addressed the HCQIA have reached the same conclusion.  Congress, then, has specifically addressed the issues of confidentiality and protection of the medical peer review process, but it has chosen not to include a privilege for peer review materials.  University of Pennsylvania warned against recognizing a privilege in just such a circumstance ‘where it appears that Congress had considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself’…  The HCQIA, then, is a clear congressional statement that no general medical peer review privilege exists in federal law.”  Mattice, supra at 385. 

In Nilavar v. Mercy Health System, Dr. Nilavar filed suit arising out of an exclusive contract/clinical privileges dispute, asserting state and federal claims.  The court granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel, stating:

“This Court is not persuaded by the Cohn court’s analysis of the import of the HCQIA.  The HCQIA was enacted in the interest of both reducing medical incompetence and protecting physicians who take part in the peer review process, which ultimately exposes such medical incompetence.  42 U.S.C. § 11101.  In return for requiring “professional review bodies,” defined as groups of health care professionals who review the work of their colleagues, report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”), among other things, any action taken which adversely affects a physician’s clinical privileges, the statute guarantees that all such information reported under this subchapter shall be considered confidential and shall not be disclosed, except under certain circumstances not relevant herein…  Far from creating a broad privilege, Congress, in enacting the HCQIA, carefully crafted a very specific privilege, applicable to peer review material submitted to the Secretary pursuant to the dictates of the mandatory reporting provisions of the statute.  That is as far as Congress went, and that is as far as this Court should apply the privilege contained therein.”  Nilavar, supra at 602.

The Nilavar decision is recommended for a thorough analysis of the authority on this issue, as well as for its analysis of related discovery issues, such as the scope of relevant information and the redaction process to protect the legitimate interests of all parties.  The court refused to unnecessarily restrict the scope of relevant discovery, stating:

“Whether the information stands at the center of the controversy or to its side, as long as the information is relevant to Plaintiff’s claim, it is discoverable, and the importance of fostering the free flow of information, which is the linchpin of fairness and truth in the judicial process, is paramount.”  Nilavar, supra at 609. 

Federal Common Law Privilege Does Not Exist

Many of these peer review dispute cases are brought in federal courts, alleging both federal and pendent state claims.  In those cases, the courts must decide whether to apply federal or state  evidentiary privilege principles, which necessarily includes the issue of whether a separate federal common law privilege for peer review documents and materials exists. 

As a procedural aside, courts routinely decide that pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the federal rules apply in these situations.

"The weight of authority among courts that the confronted this issue in the context of discovery is that the federal law of privilege governs evidence where the evidence sought might be relevant to pendent state law claims.  Robertson, supra at 82.

After concluding that the federal common law rules should apply, the courts have routinely held that no federal common law privilege exists.  “The weight of authority is that there is no peer review privilege under federal common law or HCQIA.”  Sabatier v. Barnes.

In Nilavar, the District Court concluded that a federal common law peer review privilege did not exist, and that the U.S. Supreme Court noted that there was no historical or statutory basis for the privilege in University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).

State Confidentiality Statutes

As was mentioned earlier, all the states have peer review statutes, most if not all of which will address both immunity and confidentiality.  As a practical aside, the legal practitioner must evaluate whether an action should be brought in federal or state court in relation to which rules of evidence and privilege should apply.  As part of that analysis, the potentially applicable state laws must be parsed to analyze a series of issues, i.e.

1. The definitions of peer review, peer review documents, peer review committees, etc., to determine whether the state rules actually affect the issue.

2. Waiver; and

3. Disclosure 

The most significant issue is whether the confidentiality rules apply to the physician who is the subject of the peer review process.  The state rules are generally consistent with the goals of HCQIA.  Although many predate HCQIA, they were intended to foster and protect self regulation in healthcare through the peer review process and grant immunity and confidentiality.  However, the concept of confidentiality is frequently structured to prevent outside parties from obtaining access to peer review documents and using them offensively in professional liability cases.  Therefore, many of the statutes do not apply to the subject physician. 

In both Mattice and Teasdale, supra, the courts considered the applicability of the state peer review statutes, because they were raised as affirmative defenses to discovery by the defendants.  In Teasdale, the court concluded that:  “The California privilege explicitly ‘does not apply to any person requesting hospital staff privileges.’ Cal. Evid. Code § 1157(c).”  In Mattice, the court referenced sections of the Indiana peer review statute which grant access by the physician to “any records accumulated by a peer review committee pertaining to the provider’s personal practice” and excluded records discoverable from other sources.  The Mattice court concluded:  “Even if the Court were to find that the act applied in this case, these provisions could easily mandate disclosure of at least some of the documents.” Mattice, supra at 384,

In Hayes v. Mercy Health Corp., a physician who ultimately prevailed in the medical staff hearing process, sought interim production of a tape recording of one of the peer review committee meetings.  The trial court ordered the hospital to produce the tape, and the hospital appealed.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately ordered production of the tape “without prejudice to the Hospital’s right to seek a protective order ensuring confidentiality and limiting disclosure of the tape’s contents to such uses as would be consistent with this opinion.”

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis was predicated upon the analysis of the specific language of the Pennsylvania Peer Review Act, which precluded “discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a health care provider arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee.” The Court agreed with Dr. Hayes that his case was not described in the confidentially provisions of the statute and that his discovery was not prohibited.

Discovery vs. Due Process

May heath care institutions avail themselves of HCQIA immunity without providing discovery rights?  In reviewing the cases dealing with confidentiality, there were several references to a U.S. Supreme Court case defining “due process,” i.e. Boddie v Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).  Although the case did not involve peer review, it does define “due process.”

“Due process does not, of course, require that the defendant in every civil case actually have a hearing on the merits.  A State, can, for example, enter a default judgment against a defendant who, after adequate notice, fails to make a timely appearance, see Windsor, supra, at 278, or who, without justifiable excuse, violates a procedural rule requiring the production of evidence necessary for orderly adjudication, Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 351 (1909).  What the Constitution does require is “an opportunity … granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” “for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,” Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra, at 313.  The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.”  Boddie, supra at 378.

This case may shed a new light on the HCQIA concept of due process.  The immunity provisions of HCQIA require that the peer review action must be the standards of 42 U.S.C. § 11112, subsection (a)(3) of which requires adequate notice and hearing procedures “or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances.”  In one reported case, the court found that aphysician was provided satisfactory due  process, because the process was fair even though the medical staff bylaws were not explicitly followed.    Given the language of Boddie, one might wonder whether some situations might. Require due process “greater” than the bylaws?  For example, if the peer review committee interviewed a number of “witnesses” but did not present them at a hearing, would ten physicians’ inability to cross examine those witnesses be tantamount to a denial of due process?  Would the failure to produce peer review documents be unfair?

It seems clear that peer review documents should not be confidential with respect to the subject physician or practitioner.  Furthermore, failure or refusal to provide the requisite access should be more than merely a breach of the rules of evidence; it should constitute denial of due process.

Michael Cassidy is Chair of the firm’s Healthcare Practice Group. For more information on this topic, please contact Mike at 412.594.5515 or via e-mail at mcassidy@tuckerlaw.com.

Collections During Bankruptcy Proceedings

By Brett A. Solomon, Esq.

In the business community, bankruptcy has become an everyday occurrence.  Companies overestimate their potential and turn to bankruptcy for relief of their debts and creditors’ claims.

The following article discusses basic information regarding bankruptcy court proceedings and steps to take to collect money owed to you during the bankruptcy proceedings.

There are three different types of federal bankruptcy relief available to consumer debtors.  The first, a Chapter 7, is a liquidation bankruptcy for a consumer.  The second, Chapter 13 bankruptcy, is a reorganization proceeding for individuals with regular income and whose unsecured debts are less than $25,000. The debtor is permitted to repay all or part of his or her debt over five years.  Finally, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a re-organization proceeding for any debtor, but is primarily used by businesses seeking to avoid liquidation where a debtor remains in possession of its assets and proposes a plan to repay creditors over time.

In any voluntary bankruptcy case, the case is commenced by the filing of a petition.  The debtor must also file schedules that list, among other things, all of the creditors and nature and amount of their claims as well as all of the debtor’s assets.  When a trade debtor or other party who owes you money has filed for protection under the Bankruptcy Code, all collection efforts directed against the debtor should cease.

In a Chapter 7 proceeding a trustee is appointed.  The trustee will administer the non-exempt assets of the debtor in the bankruptcy case and will make a determination as to whether or not the particular case has sufficient assets to make a distribution to unsecured creditors.  Once the debtor has filed all of the required documents and a trustee has had a chance to review them, a meeting of creditors will be scheduled by the Bankruptcy Court to interview the debtors.  Any and all creditors may be present and may question the debtors about any matter relating to their claim or to the bankruptcy. 

If the trustee determines that the case is a “No Asset Chapter 7” case (i.e., the debtor has no money to pay creditors), he/she will advise the court and request that the debtors be discharged.  Creditors will have a chance to object to the discharge within a specified period of time.  If the trustee declares the case a “No Asset Chapter 7” case, there is need  for creditors to file proofs of claim, as there will be no money or assets being distributed to unsecured creditors.  If the trustee determines that there are assets to  distribute to creditors, the trustee will provide all creditors named in the debtor’s Chapter 7 petition and schedules with a proof of claim form to be completed and filed with the Court.  Depending on the number and amount of claims filed, debtors will receive a pro rata share of the money distributed once the trustee has recovered and/or sold the assets and taken out his/her costs of administration.

In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor provides the Chapter 13 trustee and all creditors with a proposed Chapter 13 Plan that states how the debtor’s creditors are to be categorized and treated.  Plans must be filed either with the petition or within 15 days thereafter.

Upon the filing of a Chapter 13 petition and plan, the Court will set a date for the meeting of creditors and for the Plan confirmation hearing, which are usually scheduled simultaneously.  Immediately upon receiving notice of a Chapter 13 filing, creditors should provide the Court, the trustee and the debtor and its counsel with a proof of claim, whether secured or unsecured.  The Court will set a bar date after which proofs of claim may not be filed. 

In most Chapter 11 cases, meeting of creditors will typically be held 20 to 60 days after the bankruptcy petition is filed.  Again, all creditors may show up and question the debtor.  This meeting is conducted by the United States Trustee’s Office who will oversee the administration of the estate, even if the debtor is a debtor in possession. 

Similar to cases arising under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor, upon receiving notice of the filing and proof of claim form, should complete and file this form with the Court and serve it upon the U.S. Trustee, the debtor and the debtor’s attorney.  In both a Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 case, you should review the plan to see how you will be paid.  If you disagree with the plan’s description of your claim or your   treatment, you need to contact your attorney at least ten days prior to the plan confirmation hearing. If you believe that a debtor who owes you money has filed for bankruptcy or you have received notice of the debtor(s) bankruptcy filing, you should do the following:

1. Immediately cease all collection                            activities;

2. Determine under which Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code the case was filed;

3. Determine if you were listed by the debtor(s) as a creditor and how your claim will be treated in the bankruptcy;

4. Determine when proofs of claim are due in the bankruptcy;

5. In the case of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, check whether the Trustee has deter-mined if there will be distribution to creditors, which would necessitate the filing of a proof of claim.  As a general rule, if you do not file a proof of claim, you will not be entitled to receive payment from the debtor (or trustee).

If you have any questions or concerns about a particular bankruptcy proceeding for which your company is involved, please feel free to contact Brett Solomon at 412.594.3913 or via e-mail bsolomon@tuckerlaw.com.

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